TESTING FOR SPECIAL SKILLS IN EMPLOYMENT:
A NEW APPROACH TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
The use of standardized testing procedures as criteria for making

employment decisions' has recently been subjected to increasingly frequent attack in suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19642 or the fourteenth amendment. 3 Ironically, this attack has developed in spite of Title VII's approval of testing 4 and its express rejection
of racial quotas ' as a basis for hiring choices, and the Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Commission's suggestion that testing is a valid means
6
of implementing Title VII's policy of non-discrimination in hiring.
These challenges have resulted in a stringent judicial review of testing
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

(rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS].
1. The term "employment decision" includes the hiring of applicants for jobs, the
choice between current employees for promotions, and inter-departmental transfers.
Throughout this Note, the term hiring decision will be used as the model; the principles
discussed are applicable to the other decisions as well.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970). Subsection 2(a) of the Act reads as
follows:
Unlawful employment practices.
(a) Employer practices.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail
or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; Id. § 2000e-2(a).
3. [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. [N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give
and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided
that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
5. Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual
or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race . . . employed by any employer
in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race
in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work
force in any community, State, section, or other area. Id. § 2000e-2(j).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1(a) (1975). The regulation provides in part:
It is also recognized that professionally developed tests . . . may significantly
aid in the development and maintenance of an efficient work force and, indeed,
aid in the utilization and conservation of human resources generally.
TESTS
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procedures which has halted, and probably reversed, the trend toward

more widespread use of employment tests.'
This development could lead to one of three results, any of which
would have enormous impact on employment practices in the United
States. First, and most likely in the short run, is a reversion to the use
of subjective evaluation in making personnel decisions. Because subjective evaluation is not as amenable to reasoned analysis as objective

testing, its use creates increased opportunity for consideration of such
prohibited factors as race or sex in employee selection." The courts,
accordingly, are not likely to relax their scrutiny of subjective techniques, and employers will have -toovercome difficult burdens to justify

any process which has a disproportionate racial or sexual impact.9 Such
a burden may, in turn, force employers toward a second result-the
utilization of quota hiring systems in an effort to avoid litigation."0

A

third possible consequence of stringent judicial review of employment
testing, and clearly the outcome which the reviewing courts intend,
would be for employers to allocate more attention and resources to the
design and implementation of tests which will measure important job
skills without having a discriminatory impact on any minority group.
In light of the crucial role that court challenges to testing will play
in the evolution of hiring practices, this Note will analyze the present
judicial and administrative standards for assessing the validity of em-

ployment tests for jobs which require specialized training and suggest a
new framework for determining when the various procedures available

for validating tests must be applied.
7. Lancaster, FailingSystem: Job Tests Are Dropped, Wall Street J., Sept. 3, 1975,
at 1, col. 6. In 1969, fifteen to twenty percent of all charges filed under Title VII
involved testing. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws:
A General Approach to Objective Criteriaof Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv.
1598, 1637 (1969). The use of testing had burgeoned in the period following World
War II. See A. ANASTASy, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 428-34 (3d ed. 1968); Developments
in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
84 HAgv. L. REv. 1109, 1120 (1971).
8. For an example in the context of employment interviews, see Shack v. Southworth, 521 F.2d 51, 54-56 (6th Cir. 1975).
9. The EEOC definition of "test" is broad enough to encompass subjective techniques. Included are ". . . specific qualifying or disqualifying personal history or
background requirements . . . , scored interviews, biographical information blanks, in-

terviewers' rating scales, scored application forms, etc." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1975).
10. Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A
No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 106 (1974); see Fiss, A Theory of Fair
Employment Laws, 38 U. CHL L. REV. 235, 256, 279 (1971). Overt racial quota
hiring systems have actually been adopted by some employers. See, e.g., Hiatt v. City of
Berkeley, 10 F.E.P. Cas. 251 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1975).
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TESTING FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES:
THE NEED FOR A FLEXIBLE STANDARD

Establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII
requires only that a minority group member show that test usage has
resulted in a "racially disproportionate impact.'
In many situations,
this will not be difficult, since blacks and other minority group members
have tended to score lower than whites on standardized written aptitude

tests. 2 Once a racially disproportionate impact has been demonstrated,
the burden shifts to the employer to justify his hiring practice. 13 If he
cannot show that the test is "job related"'14 under the standards promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the agency
charged with administering Title VII), then he will not be permitted to
use the test results in his hiring decisions. 15

In situations not covered by Title VII, 16 suits may be brought
11. The phrase "racially disproportionate impact" is preferred by the courts not only
because it is less pejorative, but also because it is more accurate than describing a test as
"racially discriminatory." See notes 95-99 infra and accompanying text.
12. See Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1021 (1st Cir.
1974); Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (D.
Mass. 1969); Cooper & Sobol, supra note 6, at 1638-41; Fox & Lefkowitz, Differential
Validity: Ethnic Group as a Moderator in Predicting Job Performance, 27 PERSONNEL
PSYCH. 209 (1974).

The reason for this deficiency in performance has not been related to any lack
of innate intelligence but rather primarily to the socio-economic realities of a
history of economic, cultural and education deprivation to which the black race
has been subject. Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, 306 F.
Supp. at 1358.
13. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); 2 A. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.10 (1975).

14. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
15. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines as discriminatory
[t]he use of any test which adversely affects hiring, promotion, transfer or any
other employment or membership opportunity of classes protected by title VII
. . . unless: (a) the test has been validated and evidences a high degree of
utility . . . and (b) the person giving or acting upon the results of the particular test can demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promotion
procedures are unavailable for his use. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1975).
16. The scope of Title VII is uncertain. State certification procedures may be
subject to the statute even though the state is not employing those examined. In Sibley
Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that Title VII applied despite the absence of a direct
employer-employee relationship. Sibley involved a sex discrimination suit brought under
Title VII by a male private-duty nurse who alleged that the hospital refused to refer him
to female patients. Under the hospital's system, eligible nurses were referred to patients,
who in turn became the actual employers. Support can be found throughout Title VII
and the EEOC Testing Guidelines for the proposition that the intent of Congress was to
deal with more than the conventional employer-employee relationship. Thus, an employer covered by Title VII who forecloses an individual's access to employment
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under the fourteenth amendment. 17 Here the standard used by the
courts to review tests and their usage is relaxed; the test must bear only a

rational relationship to the end which is sought. 18 Since a test which is
given to all prospective employees and graded uniformly will not be
discriminatory on its face, the stringent review demanded in racial discrimination cases brought under the equal protection clause of the
9
fourteenth amendment does not come into play.'

Neither the strict statutory standard of review nor the relaxed
fourteenth amendment standard takes full cognizance of the premises
generally accepted by experts in the field of testing. Although tests and

their implementation are susceptible to abuse,20 most experts contend
that a test which is properly designed and administered is superior to
subjective methods of selection. 2 ' Valid objective tests can be especially
useful in the context of jobs which require substantial specialized train-

ing, such as teaching, accounting, architecture, or the practice of law or
medicine.22- In this area, the judicial decisions do not reflect a clear
understanding of the different types of testing procedures and the

purposes served by each.

Consequently, the courts have tended to

examine the tests being reviewed in the abstract, and have failed to give
adequate attention to the ways in which the test results are being used.
opportunities with another employer violates the statute. Puntolillo v. New Hampshire
Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974) (Racing Commission in violation of
statute for failing to certify a jockey on the basis of national origin thereby foreclosing
his opportunities to be employed by race horse owners). See also Hackett v. McGuire
Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971).
17. The fourteenth amendment, by its terms, covers only action by the states. Title
VII, as originally enacted, exempted governmental bodies from its coverage. In 1972,
this exemption was deleted so that governmental units as employers are covered. See
note 103 infra.
18. See notes 90-102 infra and accompanying text.
19. See note 95 infra and accompanying text.
20. See note 99 infra and the cases discussed therein.
21. Testing is generally considered preferable to any alternative by both employers
and minority group members. See Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power
Company: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal
Courts, 58 VA. L. REv. 844, 873 (1972). But see Cooper & Sobol, supra note 6, at 167677; Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment
and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 743-44 (1968). Some authorities continue to
consider objective testing the best means for reducing bias. See, e.g., Grossman, The
Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Its Implications for the State and Local Government
Manager, 2 PUB. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 370, 376 (1973); Comment, Employment
Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 900
(1972).
22. Jobs of this type not only require some minimum level of knowledge or skill, but
frequently involve the employer's representations to the consuming public that his
employees possess the requisite proficiency.
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For example, an employer who seeks to use an aptitude or general

intelligence test to rank job applicants in the order of their prospective
job performance can appropriately be required to demonstrate that the
test results yield accurate predictions of ultimate performance."

Where,

however, an employer does not use test results to rank applicants in the
order of predicted performance, 24 but seeks only to ensure that applicants possess the specialized knowledge which a particular job requires,
it is not always appropriate to demand a showing that a high test score
is predictive of a correspondingly high performance level.
An illustration of the second type of situation may be helpful. An

applicant for a position as a high school history teacher, it may be
assumed, -5 should have some knowledge of that subject. It is therefore
reasonable for a local school board which is screening applicants for the
job to require that they demonstrate the requisite knowledge of history

on a properly designed achievement test.26 Those who score highest
on such a test of knowledge, however, may not necessarily prove to
be the most effective history teachers when their classroom performances

are assessed.27 Many other factors, some of which are not readily
measurable, contribute to the effectiveness of a classroom instructor;
"[t]here currently are no good measures of patience, warmth, humor,
love of learning. '' 28 Still, the fact that an achievement test cannot predict which of the tested applicants will prove to be the best classroom

history teachers should not deprive the local school board of a device
23. See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 &
n.9 (1st Cir. 1974); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 374 F.
Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
24. An employer's decision not to rank applicants according to test results could be
prompted by several factors: (I) The test, in the employer's view, is not an adequate
predictor of which employees will perform better on the job, although it is useful for
other purposes, see note 37 infra and accompanying text; (2) Refining a test to make it
predictive could be very expensive; (3) The employer may prefer other means for
ranking those applicants who pass the test, such as extensive interviews or references.
25. Although it is assumed here that a knowledge of history is required in order to
teach the subject, a properly conducted job analysis would be necessary to establish
exactly what skills and abilities are required for any given position.
26. Achievement tests used in this manner are analogous to the requirement of a
degree or diploma as evidence of proficiency in an area of specialized training. See note
84 infra and accompanying text.
27. It may be difficult to determine which teachers are "successful," even apart from
the question of testing for employment decisions. Cf. Wilson, Dienst & Watson,
Characteristics of Effective College Teachers as Perceived by Their Colleagues, 10 J.
EDuc. MEASUREMENT 31 (1973); Subkoviak & Levin, Determining the Characteristicsof
the Ideal Professor: An Alternative Approach, I1 J.Eouc. MEASUREMENT 269 (1974).
See notes 67-68 infra and accompanying text.
28. Huff, Credentialing by Tests or by Degrees: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 44 ARV.EDouc. REv.246, 265 (1974).
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for ensuring that its history teachers have an adequate knowledge of
history, even where the test has a disproportionate impact on a minority
29

group.
Thus, the purpose for which an employer uses a test is clearly
relevant to the determination of whether a test which has a racially
disproportionate impact should be permitted. To understand how this
problem should be treated, it is first necessary to have a basic understanding of the principles of testing and to examine the statutory and
administrative standards applied to employment testing devices.
Testing Theory: Criterion-Relatedand Content Validation
The concept of "validity" refers to the extent to which a test
measures the qualities it purports to measure; 0 it is therefore a reflection

of the appropriateness of inferences drawn from the results of a test."
Two methods are commonly used to determine the validity of tests in
employment situations.12 The first, criterion-related validation, can be
used to assess the degree to which a test given by an employer serves the
purpose of estimating how well an individual will perform in a particu29. In a slightly different context, the Fifth Circuit recognized the state's interest in
establishing that applicants admitted to the Georgia Bar possess a minimum knowledge
of the subjects taught in law school, Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3719 (U.S. June 14, 1976), even though it was not asserted
that those who achieve the highest passing scores on the bar examination would prove
to be the best practicing attorneys; cf. United States v. North Carolina, 400 F. Supp.
343, 348-49 & n.6 (E.D.N.C. 1975) (three-judge court) (acknowledging state's right to
adopt minimum knowledge requirements for teachers but requiring that state validate
the cut-off score used to determine minimal competence).
30.

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION:

A METHOD OF

PLANNING AND EVALUATING SOCIAL INTERVENTION 32 (H. Riecken & R. Boruch eds.
1974).
31. STANDARDS 25. For a full discussion of the area of test validation, see A.
ANASTASI, supra note 7; L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (2d ed.
1960); M. DUNNETrE, PERSONNEL SELECTION AND PLACEMENT (1966); E. GHISELLI,
THE VALIDITY OF OCCUPATIONAL APTITUDE TESTS (1966); R. GUION, PERSONNEL
TESTING (1965); R. THORNDIKE, PERSONNEL SELECTION: TEST AND MEASUREMENT
TECHNIQUES (1949); Note, supra note 21, at 696-706 (1968).
32. A third process, construct validation, is based on a different approach to the
concept of validity. The purpose of this process is to determine what "constructs," or
personal characteristics, distinguish those who score high on a test from those who score
low. After extensive inductive study, the analyst formulates hypotheses about the
characteristics which are being tested for. Independent testing is then conducted to
determine whether those who score well in fact possess the suspected characteristics. See
STANDARDS 29-30.
A fourth (and highly controversial) concept, "differential validity," is based on the
idea that a test may be a valid predictor for one group but not for another. See
Sandman & Urban, Employment Testing and the Law, 27 LABOR L.J. 38, 53 (1976).
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There are two categories of criterion-related validation:

concurrent and predictive.

A concurrent validation study compares test

scores with evaluations of job performances of the tested employees.3 4
Insofar as the test scores are found to be significantly correlated with
successful job performance, the employer can then give the same test to
future job applicants with a reasonable expectation of selecting those
who will perform best as employees. There are problems inherent in
this type of study; for example, many employment situations involve
some form of post-hiring training, so present employees may not be
comparable -to job applicants." The second type of criterion-related
validation, predictive validation, is the conceptually sounder and preferred method, despite its greater cost in terms of time and money. Here,
all applicants are given the test in question and hired regardless of their

scores.3"

Subsequent job performance is then compared with the test

results to determine the extent to which the examination predicts future

success. This method is more nearly identical to the manner in which
the employer ultimately intends to use -the test.
Content validation, the second method commonly used to deter-

mine the validity of employment tests, is not a substitute for criterionrelated validation. Psychologists recognize content validation studies as
33, Criterion validity measures the extent to which a particular test produces results
which are consonant with some well-accepted indicator of whatever is being measured.
For example, if an individual wants to measure alcoholic content of the blood using a
breathalyzer, a blood test would provide the standard against which the validity of the
breathalyzer test might be measured. A simple example of criterion validity in employment testing might involve the relationship of aptitude test score results to the actual
output of a factory worker. Clearly, development of a standard is more difficult with
employment tests where it is hard to decide what constitutes success.
34. Because concurrent validation employs the individual's present successful job
performance as the chosen criterion, it can only serve as a measure of the status quo.
STANDARDS 26.
35. Another example would be a situation where few of the present employees are
minority group members. The test could be written in terminology or laden with values
foreign to minority applicants and unrelated to future job performance; these spurious
features would obscure the meaning of the test scores: As a result, many commonly
used tests, especially those testing general aptitudes or culturally related achievements,
have little if any value as predictors of performance in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs.
Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1120-22. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 425 (1971).
36. The hiring of all applicants is a critical difference. If only some of the
applicants are hired, it is impossible to know what the test scores actually mean. If
those employed were selected on the basis of the test, it is impossible to know whether
those scoring lower on the test would actually have performed more poorly on the job.
Alternatively, if those hired were selected on the basis of some criterion other than the
test, it may remain unclear whether it is the test or that criterion which controls job
performance. Only when all applicants are tested and examined can the validity of the
test be properly evaluated.
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appropriate only for achievement tests designed to measure an individu-

al's present knowledge or skills.37 Initially, the job must be analyzed
and the area of specific knowledge required for successful performance
must be delineated. A hiring test will be content-valid if it adequately
measures only that area of knowledge, and no other. In the case of the
history teacher discussed above, for example, the qualifying test would
be content-valid if it accurately measured knowledge of the historical
subject matter covered by the curriculum. 38
THE TITLE VII STANDARD OF

REVIEw

Administrative Interpretation
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.39 In theory, hiring must be done on a "color-blind" basis 40 so
that any minority group applicant who is sufficiently qualified, or
readily qualifiable, to perform a job is given an opportunity equal to that
of a similarly situated white applicant. Testing is expressly recognized
as a lawful employment practice, provided that the "test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate .. .. *"I'
In fact, discussion in Congress during the debate on Title VII focused upon salvaging professionally developed tests
that measure relevant abilities and skills.4 2
37. See A. ANASTASI, supra note 7, at 102, 391, 428-34; Cooper & Sobol, supra note
7, at 1643-44. It may, however, be appropriate in special circumstances to assess the
content validity of aptitude tests. STANDARDS 28.
It is important to note that although a test may be content-valid, it is not necessarily
suitable for predicting performance, particularly in positions for which on-the-job training is feasible. A content-valid test indicates only that the applicant has some proficiency in the tested skill or subject. Only where the tested area coincides almost entirely
with the totality of skills required in a position would the test predict performance. Cf.
STANDARDS

29.

38. Sources for determining the proper subject-matter of the test might include
textbooks, course syllabi, and consultations with subject-matter experts. See A.
ANAsTASI,

supra note 7, at 101.

39. See note 2 supra.
40. This would reject hiring by any quota-related method which mandated colorawareness. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970), quoted note 5 supra;cf. Hiatt v. City of
Berkeley, 10 F.E.P. Cas. 251 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1975).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). For the full text of this subsection see note 4
supra.
42. At the time of the Congressional debates, attention was focused orr Myart v.
Motora, Inc., a decision by a hearing examiner of the Illinois Fair' Empi6ynent Practices
Commission. The text of this decision is quoted in full at 110 CONG. Rac. 5662-64
(1964). The case was considered at the time to invalidate all professionally developed
tests.
Debate over what constitutes "relevant abilities" has occupied many writers in the
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)43 has
drafted "Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures ' 44 pursuant to
the authority granted to it by Congress. 45 Stating that the Guidelines
are based on a "belief that properly validated and standardized employee selection procedures can significantly contribute to the implementation of non-discriminatory personnel policies,' 46 the EEOC has sought
to eliminate the use of testing as a vehicle for covert discrimination.
The Guidelines, therefore, were carefully drafted to be both stringent
and broad in scope.4 7 For the purposes of the Guidelines, "test" is
defined as "any paper-and-pencil or performance measure," including
all formal, scored, quantified or standardized techniques such as measures of general intelligence, mental or learning ability, and knowledge
or proficiency. 48 The Guidelines also -treat specific qualifying requirefield. In a response to the arguments against employment tests presented in Note, supra
note 21, Professor Ruch voiced the opinion that even a general intelligence test should be
considered valid if general intelligence is relevant to the level to which the applicant
might be promoted. Ruch & Ash, Comments on Psychological Testing, 69 COLuM. L.
REv. 608, 611 (1969). But cf. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1643:
It is sometimes argued that standardized intelligence tests are inherently
related to business needs on the ground that every employer is entitled to prefer
more intelligent employees ....
This notion misconceives the function of
tests. Industrial employers need people who can do industrial jobs better; to
the extent that requires a certain mental capacity, the employer can be said
to need a more "intelligent" employee or one with certain kinds of comprehension. But a paper and pencil test asking general questions does not necessarily
measure the relevant mental capacity. It measures the capacity to answer
questions on the test. This may or may not be related to the capacity to perform well on particular jobs.
43. The EEOC is composed of five members appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, with the members serving staggered five year terms. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1970).
44. 29 C.F.R. H8 1607.1 et seq. (1975). For a discussion of the development of the
Guidelines and of the EEOC's very broad interpretation of Title VII, see Blumrosen,
Strangers in Paradisc: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1970). The Guidelines, ostensibly interpretations of Title
VII, were not promulgated as rules under the notice-and-comment provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). Agency compliance with the
statute is not required for purely interpretive regulations, id. § 553 (b) (3)(A); however,
several Guidelines provisions detail specific validation requirements not mentioned in the
statute. These provisions might have elicited critical response from some psychologists
had the notice-and-comment procedure been followed. See Humphreys, Statistical
Definitions of Test Validity for Minority Groups, 58 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1973)
(criticizing failure of Guidelines to set out methods of validation and resulting usage of
statistically inaccurate procedures); Grossman, supra note 21, at 378 (EEOC Guidelines
appear to raise a presumption against tests).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1(a) (1975).
47. For a discussion of the promulgation of the EEOC Guidelines by the person
who served as Chairman of the Commission at the time of their drafting, see Blumrosen,
supra note 44, at 60-61.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1975).
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ments, such as educational history, and other selection techniques, such
9
as unscored or casual interviews.
The EEOC Guidelines expressly accept the American Psychological Association's Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests,5"
and the Standardsin turn specifically recognize content validation to be

appropriate for assessing the validity of achievement tests. 51

The

Guidelines, however, place great stress on criterion-related validation

techniques for all employment tests,5 2 permitting resort to content validation only where the employer can show that criterion-related validation is "not feasible.""3
Since any test used'as a basis for personnel decisions is predictive in
some sense, it is reasonable that the Guidelines should express a prefer-

ence for a validation technique which assesses predictive efficacy. Where
test scores are utilized to rank applicants along a scale of anticipated job
success, the predictive nature of -the test is clear. Where the test is used

only to ensure requisite skill or knowledge in a given area, the test scores
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.13 (1975).
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1975). This provision states that
[f]or the purpose of satisfying the requirements of this part, empirical evidence in support of a test's validity must be based on studies employing generally accepted procedures for determining criterion-related validity, such as
those described in "Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and
Manuals" published by the American Psychological Association.
51. STANDARDS 28.
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5. Minimum standardsfor validation.
(a) . .. Evidence of content or construct validity, as defined in ["Standards
for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals"], may also be appropriate where criterion-related validity is not feasible. However, evidence for
content or construct validity should be accompanied by sufficient information
from job analyses to demonstrate the relevance of the content (in the case of
job knowledge or proficiency tests) or the construct (in the case of trait
measures). Evidence of content validity alone may be acceptable for welldeveloped tests that consist of suitable samples of the essential knowledge,
skills or behaviors composing the job in question. The types of knowledge,
skills or behaviors contemplated here do not include those which can be acquired in a brief orientation to the job. (Emphasis added).
53. Id. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 515 F.2d 956, 965 n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976); Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
Another federal agency, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC),
although purportedly imposing the same requirements as the EEOC, 41 C.F.R. § 603.1(c) n.1 (1974), accepts content validation for tests given to determine whether an
applicant possesses some skill or knowledge needed for a job. The OFCC "Guidelines"
provide:
(b) Content validity: Content validity is an appropriate type of validity to
demonstrate for skills tests (that is, tests to determine whether an individual
already possesses needed skills or knowledge) and certain other selection procedures but it is not ordinarily an appropriate type of validity to fully support
aptitude or intelligence tests (that is, tests to determine whether an individual
can learn needed skills or knowledge). Also, content validity sometimes may
be accepted as provisional compliance where criterion related is preferred but
is not technically feasible. Id.§ 60-3.6(b).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1976:596

are nonetheless predictive in the sense that they project a lack of success
for those applicants who fail to achieve the minimum score. In addition, the only recognized justifications for the use of tests which have a
disproportionate racial impact are the safety and efficiency of the employer's businessA' That is, an employer can use such a test only if he
can demonstrate that his business is made safer or more efficient through
the selection of the best-qualified employees. The greatest business effi-

ciency is achieved when the selection procedure actually indicates with
some degree of precision which individuals among a given group of
applicants will perform best on the job. A test which can demonstrate
predictive criterion-related validity should therefore be preferred.
JudicialReview Standards

Under recent decisions of -the Supreme Court, the EEOC Guidelines, including the marked preference for criterion-related validation,
are to be accorded "great deference" in Title VII actions.55 Neither the
54. See Note, supra note 10, at 108.
55. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975), quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971); see Sandman & Urban, supra note 32, at 43.
Griggs was the first case before the Supreme Court in which tests were challenged under
Title VII. In Griggs, on the day Title VII became effective, a company with a history of
overt racial discrimination began requiring a high school diploma and satisfactory scores
on two professionally developed aptitude tests for its factory positions. 401 U.S. at 42728. It was demonstrated that these requirements limited the advancement of blacks who
were already working for the company, as well as the initial employment of black
applicants. Id. at 426-28. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, found
that the employer had not shown the tests to be job-related in the face of their racially
disproportionate impact. Id. at 431. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that
the general EEOC Guidelines under Title VII were "inescapably" entitled to great
deference; the Court felt that the Guidelines were supported both by the language of
Title VII and by its legislative history. Id. at 434-36. Despite the Court's interpretation,
there are indications that the statute was never intended to prohibit tests administered
equally to blacks and whites. See Wilson, supra note 21, at 852-58; Developments in the
Law, supra note 7, at 1123-26; Note, supra note 21, at 706-10.
The Griggs Court paid deference only to the general Guidelines and not to the
specific provisions regarding test validation. These technical validation Guidelines have
been recognized as controlling at the Court of Appeals level. See, e.g., Davis v.
Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 44 U.S.L.W. 4789
(U.S. June 7, 1976); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
The Guidelines have also been substantially adopted by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.1(c) n.1 (1974).
In Moody, a case arising out of facts very similar to those in Griggs, the Supreme
Court,. while recognizing that the Guidelines were not rules, did measure a test challenged under Title VII against the detailed test validation Guidelines.' The coxhpany had
a psychologist perform a validation study on the eve of the trial. In invalidating his
findings, the Court relied heavily on their nonconformance with the Guidelines. 422
U.S. at 430-36. Chief Justice Burger, this time concurring in part and dissenting in part,
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Supreme Court nor the lower courts, however, have attempted to construe the "not feasible" language of the Guidelines; the courts have yet
to treat in a systematic manner the problem of determining when a
content-valid achievement test is permissible in the absence of a showing
of predictive validity. The Guidelines might be read to bar the use of
content validation in every situation where an employer is unable to
demonstrate the technological impossibility of designing a test which
would have predictive validity. Alternatively, the "not feasible" language could support an interpretation that content validation is appropriate where it is either impracticable or very costly for an employer to
develop a test which can be validated by the criterion-related approach.
The legislative history of Title V1156 and the policy which the Act
embodies both counsel against rigid rejection of a validating technique
recognized as appropriate by the American Psychological Association. It
must be recalled that Title VII does not automatically prohibit an
employer from using a test which has a disproportionate impact on a
minority group if the test can be justified by the added safety and
efficiency which it brings to the employer's business." With this in
mind, one can proceed to examine the settings in which an employer
might seek -to use a test which has content validity but which has not
been shown to have predictive validity.
CONTENT VERSUS CRITERION VALIDATION:

A

PROPOSED ANALYSIS

Predictive Ranking

Scores on a criterion-validated test, as noted above,5 8 will show a
positive correlation with some objective measure of successful job performance. Content validation, on the other hand, indicates only that
the test does in fact measure the same skill or knowledge that it purports
to assess.59 In judging the permissibility of a content-validated test
id. at 449, could not accept the Court's deference to the EEOC. By using the Guidelines
in this manner, he observed, the Court treated them as rules although they had not been
promulgated as such under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Chief Justice drew a
distinction between the Guideline relied upon in Griggs, which was a general interpretation of Title VII, and those followed in Moody, which delineated specific methods for
proving job-relatedness. Id. at 451-52.
56. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.

57. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
59. This point is an important one. It might be said that a test is not content-valid,
even though it is an accurate measure of the subject it purports to measure, if that subject
is not important in the job. There is really no difference between that statement and the
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under Title VII, -the critical question is therefore whether use of the test
would contribute -to the employer's efficiency in selecting capable employees. In determining efficiency, it must be ascertained whether the
area of knowledge or skill tested for is in fact necessary or useful in the
job which the employer seeks to fill. A properly designed and executed
job analysis is normally used to answer -the latter question. However,
even where it can be shown that the test is an accurate measure of the
applicant's knowledge of certain subject matter and that the subject
matter is related to the job sought, the employer cannot claim that the
test results are predictive. A content-valid test may be used to determine minimum competence, but it cannot support the inference that
those who achieve higher scores will be the better performers on the job.
Thus, whenever an employer makes use of a content-validated test
to rank applicants in the order of their test scores, it is appropriate that
the employer bear a heavy burden in demonstrating why a criterionvalid test should not be required. The use of any test reflects an
implicit belief on the part of the user that -the test actually predicts which
applicants will be the "better" employees. A content-valid test, however, is by definition an inadequate basis for ranking applicants. The
employer is therefore confronted with a seemingly insoluble logical
dilemma: there can be no business efficiency justification for using the
content-validated test unless it is asserted that the test will fulfill a
predictive function for which it is inherently unsuited.
An equally heavy burden should be imposed on an employer who
does not use test scores for overt ranking purposes, but who sets a cutoff score in order to eliminate a selected percentage of applicants." The
use of such a cut-off, adjusted from year to year as market conditions
demand, is in reality a crude form of ranking applicants. For example,
should the employer set a cut-off score which he estimates would
eliminate thirty percent of the applicants for a position, a score based on
a projected need for approximately seventy percent of the applicant
population, the employer is effectively using the test scores to predict
that those above the cut-off will be more successful on the job than those
below it. 1
one in the text to the effect that a test may be content-valid but must still be related to
job skills. The point worth emphasizing is that the content-valid test is not a predictor of
success; it is rather a measure of proficiency in certain areas.
60. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 12 F.E.P.
Cas. 651, 659, 673 (C.D. Cal. 1976); cf. Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919,
924-25 (4th Cir. 1974).
61. The fact that the cut-off score for one time period may be lower than that for
the next belies any assertion that the cut-off is selected as the point which separates
qualified from unqualified applicants.
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Testing for Minimum Competence

Employment testing for jobs which require substantial specialized
training presents a very different question of test score utilization.
In this context, it is frequently important for employers to be able to
ensure that each applicant selected for a position possesses some minimum of knowledge or proficiency in a subject or skill 'Thus, as in the
illustration presented earlier, a local school board may rely on a standardized achievement test to assure itself that applicants for teaching
positions in history have some minimum knowledge of the subject to be
taught.
This use of test results is distinguishable from those uses involving
either overt or covert prediction. As noted, 62 it is predictive, but only
in the sense that an employer anticipates that those applicants who
cannot demonstrate some level of proficiency in a subject of specialized
training will not be qualified to hold down the job which is sought.
Here, the employer does not make the claim that the procedure increases
business efficiency by enabling him to hire only the better applicants.
Rather, the justification advanced is that a core of knowledge or skills is
essential for adequate execution of the tasks involved; the efficiency gain
arises from avoiding the costs of employing people who are simply
unable to discharge their duties-not the costs of employing less productive workers. Additionally, an employer who holds out to the public
that his staff possesses some particular expertise can assert that this use
of test scores is necessary to provide objective evidence in support of the
claimed expertise. For example, a local school board or a private
school which represents that its teachers are all competent in their
respective subject areas must be able to support that claim.
These very different reasons for reliance on test results suggest that
it may not be appropriate to insist on criterion validation in this special
area.63 Where an employer makes no claim that higher test scores
62. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
63. The Standards put forth by the American Psychological Association also fail to
take into account this use of achievement testing: "An employer cannot justify an
employment test on grounds of content validity if he cannot demonstrate that the content
universe includes all, or nearly all, important parts of the job." STANDARDS 29. That
statement, taken at face value, would prohibit content validation for the limited achievement testing discussed here. Support for not following the Standards on this point is
drawn from the close analogy between this use of testing and the requirement of degrees
or diplomas, see note 84 infra and accompanying text, and the Supreme Court's express
refusal to subject such diploma requirements to the Guidelines validation procedure.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.8 (1971); League of United Latin
American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 12 F.E.P. Cas. 651, 672 (C.D. Cal. 1976). But
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predict better performance, and does not use the scores in a way which
ranks applicants, content validation should not be presumed improper.
Justifying a Content-Valid Test. Once an employer who seeks to
defend his use of an achievement test has established that test results are
not utilized to rank applicants, but only to guarantee minimal knowledge or proficiency in an area of specialized training, two questions
remain for the court. First, what type of showing must the employer
make to overcome the Guidelines' preference for a criterion-valid test?
Second, even where content validation (as opposed to criterion validation) is appropriate, in what situations may an employer make use of an
achievement test which has a disproportionate racial impact?
Identifying the use made of test results clearly represents a large
step toward answering the first inquiry: where applicants are ranked
according to test result, criterion validation should generally be required.6 4 Where ranking is not employed, however, the courts must
look further to determine whether criterion validation is "feasible" under
the EEOC Guidelines. This Note has urged that the Guidelines not be
construed so rigidly as to require a showing of the technical impossibility
of criterion validation; rather, an employer 'who can demonstrate the
impracticability or prohibitive cost of designing a criterion-valid test
should be able to resort to the less preferred technique. 5 How an
employer goes about making this showing of impracticability is a question which the courts have not yet considered.
It should be recalled that an employer who seeks to use a contentvalid achievement test must concede that the test results do not predict
which applicants will perform better as employees. Still, the employer
may claim that the achievement test does increase his business efficiency
by identifying those applicants who do not possess the minimum knowledge or skill in a subject area which is important in the position. Either
of two circumstances could support such an argument by the employer.
see Note, Diplomas, Degrees, and Discrimination, 26 HAsTMGs LJ. 1377, 1388-89
(1975).
64. The only plausible justification for use of content validation in this context
would be the claim that it is either impossible or prohibitively expensive to define with
adequate precision the appropriate criterion of job success. The argument would be that
it is not possible to rank employees as better or worse according to some performance
criterion; i.e., that there is no sufficiently concrete measure of job success. Simultaneously, however, the employer must assert that the factors measured by the test are so
important for the job and so coincident with the total domain of job requirements that
ranking is justified. Although the Standards apparently contemplate this situation,
STANDARDS 29, it is not likely that the argument would be successful apart from jobs with
very narrowly defined requisites, such as typing positions, id.
65. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
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First, there may be no concrete criterion of job success. That is,
an employer may plausibly assert that it is either impossible or prohibitively expensive66 to ascertain which of his employees are "better" than
others.67

Thus, while it may be relatively simple to gauge the job

success of assembly line workers by measuring daily production or
number of errors, it might be extremely difficult to make a quantitative

assessment of the performance of an architect or a police detective."8 At
the same time, it is clear that a qualified architect must have some
understanding of techniques of design and the physical properties of

various building materials; the police detective must possess a working
knowledge of criminal law and modem methods of crime detection.
Content-valid tests should therefore be permitted in this context.

The second circumstance in which content validation should be
allowed may best be illustrated by reviewing the earlier example of the

high school history teacher. 9 Assuming that a success criterion for
history teachers is ascertainable,7 ° one might still show the infeasibility
of using a criterion-valid test by demonstrating that some of the qualities
which make a good teacher are not measurable by current testing
techniques.

A properly conducted job analysis might reveal, for exam-

ple, that a high school history teacher needs qualities A, B, C, D, E, and
F. Of these qualities, only A, B, and C-a knowledge of the subject

matter taught in history classes, proficiency in pedagogical techniques,
and an understanding of the principles of psychology--can be measured
66. "Prohibitively expensive" would mean that the cost of designing and implementing a criterion-valid testing process would exceed the value of efficiency gains to be
derived from use of the test results. That is, it may be cheaper for an employer to hire
some less qualified employees and "weed them out" over time than to screen out that
group in advance. It should be noted that there may be a substantial difference between
the cost of employing "less competent" workers and the cost of hiring "incompetent"
workers.
67. It may be extremely difficult to define an appropriate criterion of job success,
see note 68 infra and accompanying text, and it is obviously crucial to the adequacy of
the test that the criterion itself be valid. STANDARDS 27. There is some evidence, for
example, that an employee's sex and race tend to bias the job performance ratings given
by supervisors. Bigoness, Effect of Applicant's Sex, Race, and Performance on Employeas' Performance Ratings: Some Additional Findings, 61 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 80
(1976).
68. Cf. Hughes, Mistakes at Work, 17 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. Sci. 322 (1951),
reprinted in PROFESSIONALIZATON 148 (H. Vollmer & D. Mills eds. 1966).
69. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
70. One possible criterion would be the performance of those students taught by the
instructor in a content-valid achievement test for history. Another would be the
evaluation of an instructor by his colleagues. Cf. Wilson, Dienst & Watson, supra note
27; Subkoviak & Levin, supra note 27. The deficiencies inherent in both of these criteria
are apparent. See note 67 supra.
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Factors D, E, and F-

"patience, warmth [and] humor" 71 -cannot be measured in advance by
a test. Because several crucial factors are not measurable, it would not
be reasonable for a local school board to attempt to design a test which
would be used to rank applicants. Yet the importance of those factors
which are measurable strongly suggests that the school board should be
72
permitted to test for some minimal proficiency in these areas.

In these two situations 71-where there is no appropriate criterion

of job success or where there are factors which are immeasurable that
may contribute to success-the courts should adopt a balancing ap-

proach which is structurally similar to the balancing mandated for hiring
decisions by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"4 but
with an emphasis on different factors. Griggs requires the balancing of

a racially disproportionate impact against the increased efficiency which
results from use of the challenged test. In parallel fashion, a decision to
permit a content-valid test where use of a criterion-valid test would be
impractical should be based on a weighing of the reduction of dispro-

portionate impact which a criterion-valid test would yield against the
added expense and difficulty of designing and implementing such a

test. 75 The crucial question, therefore, is the extent to which criterion
validation improves upon content validation in removing the discriminatory impact of the test.
The Burden of Proof. Allocation of the burden of proof on this
question is of fundamental importance. If the employer must demonstrate that a change to a criterion-valid test would be ineffective in
reducing the disproportionate impact, he is unlikely to be able to meet
71. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
72. The cut-off point itself must be valid if the testing procedure is to pass muster.
An arbitrary cut-off, see United States v. North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343, 349
(E.D.N.C. 1975) (three-judge court), or one set simply to limit the influx of potential
employees, see Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919, 925 (4th Cir. 1974), should
not be permitted if the testing procedure has a disproportionate racial impact.
73. The two situations described are not mutually exclusive. It is possible, indeed
likely, that a position for which no appropriate success criterion can be established also
requires several employee skills or traits which are not measurable by a pre-employment
objective testing device. See Sandman & Urban, supra note 32, at 48.
74. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Note, supra note 10, at 101. See also Affeldt, Title
VII in the Federal Courts-Private or Public Law, 15 VILL. L. REv. 1, 31 (1969);
Wilson, supra note 21, at 851; Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation: A Uniform Standard for Both Public and Private Employers, 41
GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 505, 508, 521 (1973).
75. It is important to note that the question considered here is not whether the
testing device may be used at all, see notes 41-54 supra and accompanying text, but
whether a criterion-valid procedure is a reasonable alternative to the challenged contentvalid test. Cf. Note, supra note 10.
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his burden except where he can show the virtual impossibility of design-

ing a criterion-valid procedure. That is, the employer would be placed
in the position of having to prove the negative proposition that a

different type of test would not lead to any significant improvement.
Such a showing clearly would be most difficult and very expensive, and
it is unlikely that employers would be able--or willing-to make it.7"
As a consequence, a court which balances the potential reduction of
disproportionate impact against the difficulty of implementing a criterion-valid procedure will inevitably find for the plaintiff unless it can be
shown that the preferred test is technically impossible to design.
Requiring the employer to show that there is no less discriminatory

77
alternative to his testing procedure is therefore plainly unworkable.

Rather, the plaintiff should be required to prove the converse proposi-

tion-that there is a criterion-valid procedure which would reduce the
undesirable impact of a content-valid test.7 8

In the first situation

described above, 79 where the employer asserts that there is no appropriate criterion of job success, a plaintiff should be required to show two
things before a content-valid test can be struck down simply because it is

not criterion-valid. First, it must be shown that it is neither impossible
nor prohibitively expensive to fashion a criterion of job success. 80 Second, there should be a showing of some probability that such a criterionvalid procedure would indeed have a less disproportionate impact. Similarly, in the second situation, where the criteria of success are only

partially ascertainable but where several important factors are measura76. Indeed, many employers have already abandoned the use of objective tests rather
than incur the expense of validation and litigation. See note 7 supra and accompanying
text.
77. See Note, supra note 10, at 113.
78. Id. The Supreme Court apparently has adopted this approach:
If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are "job
related," it remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve
the employer's legitimate interest in "efficient and trustworthy workmanship."
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citation omitted).
79. See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text.
80. Consider, for example, Coopersmith v. Roudebush, 517 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir.
1975), wherein an applicant for a position as an attorney with the Board of Veterans
Appeals charged sex discrimination in a test given for that position. The Board had
attempted to fashion a criterion of job success in the form of performance on a typical
case handled by the Board attorneys, and pre-tested applicants by requiring them to work
through the sample problem. (The charges stemmed from the subjective evaluation
which must accompany such a loosely structured test.)
Other methods a plaintiff might use to establish the appropriateness of a success
criterion include evidence of the practices of similar employers and testimony by job
analysis experts.
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ble,11 the plaintiff should be required to demonstrate both that there are
means of measuring the factors not tested for and that there is at least a
reasonable probability that the addition of these factors to the test would
reduce its disproportionate impact.
It is clear that such proof will be difficult for the plaintiff to
marshall. Moreover, where it is practicable to use a criterion-valid
screening mechanism, most employers who seek to maximize efficiency
in their selection procedures will already have adopted the preferred
technique voluntarily. An employer is likely to be reluctant to change
testing procedures only where the increase in efficiency which he esti2
mates is less than the cost of designing and implementing the new test.
In such a case, the role of a reviewing court would be to evaluate the
legitimacy of the balancing already performed by the employer.
This apparently heavy burden on the plaintiff may seem unwarranted in light of the Title VII mandate that discriminatory testing is not
permissible unless a business justification is present. It must be remembered, however, that the plaintiffs burden is not to prove the absence of
a business justification, but to demonstrate the feasibility of criterion
validation once the employer has shown that his use of test results is an
appropriate content-valid procedure. Even where the plaintiff fails to
carry this burden, the employer is still required to show a business
justification for the use of the test.
Business Justification. A determination of business justification
depends on an evaluation of the "job-relatedness" of the test. 8 In
making this determination, a reviewing court should ask the same
questions which are asked in scrutinizing diploma and degree requirements.8 4 Use of a content-valid test is analytically similar to a degree
81. See notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text.
82. There is, of course, the possibility that the employer may be using the test
results as a covert form of intentional racial discrimination or as a pretext for racially
motivated hiring. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 426 (1975);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973). Where there is
evidence of such covert discrimination, the court should require a very convincing
demonstration by the employer of the business efficiency to be derived from the testing
procedure. Cf. Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1974);
Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir.
1972).
83. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). See also
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); Sandman & Urban, supra note 32, at 38-39; Note,
supra note 10, at 107-13.
84. See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 12 F.E.P. Cas. 770 (N.D. Miss.
1976); League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 12 F.E.P. Cas.
651 (C.D. Cal. 1976). For a criticism of the use of diploma and degree requirements,

Vol. 1976:596]

EMPLOYMENT TESTING

requirement in that, while in neither case are all the factors contributing
to success on the job measured, both a passing test score and the
possession of a degree are believed to demonstrate proficiency in a
subject or skill which is important to job performance."5 The court
should therefore ask: (1) whether the test measures only those skills or
subjects important in the job, 8 and (2) whether the subjects measured
are significant in relation to the total requirements of the position. The

answers to these questions will guide the court in determining how much
efficiency the employer will gain by using the content-valid test. That
determination will be balanced according to the Griggs standard against
the magnitude of the disproportionate impact to decide whether the
testing procedure is permissible."'

If achievement testing for jobs which require specialized training is
not to be discouraged unnecessarily, another factor should be taken into

account in this balancing process. A court should give some deference
to the steps taken by an employer in the preparation of testing procedures. Where a test is prepared or selected haphazardly, for instance,

by a personnel director who makes the selection without the aid of
psychological testing experts, the courts should require a very strong

showing of increased efficiency. A test prepared at some expense by
recognized experts in testing, on the other hand, should be accorded

some presumption of validity. An employer using a test in the latter
category should not be forced to bear the great expense of duplicating
the validation of his testing procedures where both the test and the

appropriate cut-off have been determined in a systematic way.

This

"sliding scale" approach to test scrutiny has been used in the Second

Circuit, 8 and would seem to be appropriate for application in all Title
and the argument that such selection devices should be subject to the EEOC Guidelines,
see Note, supra note 63. See also Huff, supra note 28.
85. It can be argued that the achievement test device is a significant improvement
over degrees and diplomas, since the former is not complicated by variations in quality
among schools. In League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 12
F.E.P. Cas. 651 (C.D. Cal. 1976), for example, there was evidence that the high
schools in the Santa Ana area would graduate any student who could read at a fifthgrade level. Id. at 657.
86. This question is generally answered by a job analysis, but it raises very difficult
and important issues where specialized training is required for a job. See notes 37-38
supra and accompanying text.
87. Where there is a history of overt discrimination by the employer, the court will
require a very strong showing of efficiency gains through the "job-relatedness" of the
test. See note 99 infra.
88. Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y. City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387,
395-96 (2d Cir. 1973). Two recent applications of the approach are found in Jones v.
New York City Human Resources Admin., 528 F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1976), and
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VII cases. 0
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT STANDARD AND ITS

CONTINUING VIABILITY IN THE REVIEW OF TESTING

The TraditionalStandardof Review
The fourteenth amendment is used to challenge tests in circumstances in which Title VII does not apply. Although the scope of Title
VII has not yet been conclusively determined, 0 it appears that state
certification procedures which are designed to determine whether an

individual possesses the expertise needed in a particular field are subject
only to the more relaxed standards of fourteenth amendment review.
The traditional fourteenth amendment standard was articulated in Dent
v. West Virginia."' The Court stated that there is no deprivation of a
right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment when a state refuses to
license an individual due to his failure to comply with regulations
promulgated for the general welfare.92

It is within the power of the

state, the Court concluded, "to prescribe all such regulations as, in its
judgment, will secure or tend to secure [its people] against the conseKirkland v.New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420, 425-26 (2d Cir.
1975).
89. A three-judge federal court in North Carolina may have taken the same
approach toward the validation of a cut-off score on a standardized teaching examination. See United States v. North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343, 348-49 & n.6 (E.D.N.C.
1975). Carried to its logical conclusion, an absolute refusal to permit content validation
of professional competence examinations would necessitate a complete restructuring of
professional recruitment practices. Consider the example of the legal profession. The
vulnerability of the bar examination is obvious: the impossibility of defining "success"
as a lawyer makes it equally impossible to determine whether a given test is an adequate
predictor of success. Beyond this, however, the traditional reliance of legal employers
on law school grades as a selection criterion would also be subject to attack. An employer using law school grades for selection purposes is implicitly relying on law school
examinations as valid ranking tools. It is doubtful, though, whether it could be shown
that law school course examinations are accurate measures of important job skills, or
even that law school courses teach such skills. For a discussion of these issues in the
recently controversial context of the North Carolina teacher certification process, see
Charlotte Observer, July 11, 1976, § B, at 2, col. 1. See notes 100-02 infra and
accompanying text.
90. See note 16 supra.
91. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
92. Id. at 122. States have long used educational requirements and proficiency
examinations to ascertain whether an individual is qualified to practice in a field, such as
medicine or law, which directly affects the general welfare of its people.
[I]t has been the practice of different States from time immemorial, to exact
in many pursuits a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently rely, their possession being generally ascertained upon an
examination of parties by competent persons. . . . Id.
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quences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud."'9 3
In sustaining a West Virginia statute which required a diploma from a
recognized institution or an adequate performance on an examination

for certification as a physician, the Court held that such a requirement
could only be overturned if it bore no reasonable relation to the practice

of the profession: "If [the qualifications] are appropriate to the calling or
profession, and attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to their validity can be raised because of their stringency or difficulty." 94
The Title VII showing of "racially disproportionate impact" has

not been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights.95 The

traditional constitutional standard was most recently reaffirmed in
Washington v. Davis, an employment testing challenge brought under
the fifth amendment. 96 The Court specifically rejected an effort to
93. id. Such requirements are time-tested means of assuring that practitioners are
competent. Rasulius v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 1006, 1010 (7th Cir. 1974) (involving the
licensing of physical therapists). See also Western Addition Organization v. Alioto, 360
F. Supp. 733, 734 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (test for policemen struck down, but court noted
that city had the right to test); England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 246
F. Supp. 993 (E.D. La. 1965), aff'd mem., 384 U.S. 885 (1966) (not irrational and
unreasonable for state legislature to require chiropractors to comply with licensing
provisions).
94. 129 U.S. at 122. As long as they apply uniformly to all who seek certification,
such qualifications will not be deemed arbitrary. See id. at 124.
95. Even where it has had the opportunity to do so, the Supreme Court has refused
to hold conclusively that a policy that is facially neutral and evenly applied is violative of
the fourteenth amendment because of its disproportionate impact. Tyler v. Vickery, 517
F.2d 1089, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3719 (U.S. June
14, 1976), citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); cf. James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (upholding amendment to state constitution requiring a referendum for low-income housing).
There are, however, a number of circuit court decisions which appear to apply the
disproportionate impact test to purely constitutional challenges to employment testing
procedures. See note 103 infra and accompanying text. Such cases have been strongly
criticized. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d at 1095-97.
96. 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976). In Davis, two blacks whose applications to become District of Columbia police officers had been rejected challenged a
written test of verbal aptitude which had been used in the selection process and
"which excluded a disproportionately high number of Negro applicants." Id. at
4790. Finding the test to be neutral on its face and rationally related to the legitimate
government purpose of upgrading the verbal abilities of police officers, the Court held
the "more vigorous" Title VII standard inapplicable:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more
than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about,
and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory,
and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the
average black than to the more affluent white.
. .. [E]xtension of the rule beyond those areas where it is already ap-
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extend the. applicability of Title VII to non-statutory contexts, and

required instead a showing of discriminatory purpose. The significance
of this decision in the testing area is apparent. If it is assumed that racial
differences in test performance reflect cultural and educational variations, and are not based on disparities in genetically determined cognitive abilities, 97 then it will be virtually impossible to prove that a test is

racially discriminatory in itself-the rejoinder will be that the test itself
is not biased, but is merely an accurate reflection of underlying social
conditions.98 Therefore, claiming that a test is racially biased will be
feasible only if the test is clearly discriminatory or where there is
evidence that it is being used in an intentionally discriminatory manner.

09

plicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public employment, should
await legislative prescription. Id. at 4794.
97. See Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1358
(D. Mass. 1969), quoted in note 8 supra; Note, Employment Discrimination:Statistics
and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA. L. REv. 463, 474 (1973).
98. It is for this reason that recent efforts to require differential validation by race
will be inadequate to correct many of the most dangerous effects of employment testing.
As a result of the numerous studies emphasizing the need for validation by race, see, e.g.,
Rudy & Albright, Racial Differences on Selection Instruments Related to Subsequent Job
Performance, 21 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 31 (1968), both the EEOC, see 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4
(1975), and the courts, see Sandman & Urban, supra note 32, at 53, have begun to insist
on differential validation! with increasing frequency.
Validation by race solves only part of the problem. As the authors of one
psychological study recently concluded:
[Those] concerned with the applicability of employment tests to minority
groups should probably direct their future efforts to the study and determination of test fairness rather than to the pseudoproblem of racial differences in
[test validity]. Schmidt, Berner & Hunter, Racial Differences in Validity of
Employment Tests: Reality or Illusion?, 58 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 5, 8 (1973).
See also Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (D.
Mass. 1969), quoted in note 8 supra. Modern analytic methods have apparently begun
to reduce the racial disparities in testing validity. See Campbell, Tests Are Valid for
Minority Groups Too, 2 PuB. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 70 (1973) (concluding that
aptitude tests predict as well for minorities and that where the test is apt to be biased, it
is more likely to overpredict job performance for minority group members). The
problem which must now be addressed concerns the actual fairness of the whole testing
procedure.
99. A history of racial discrimination may provide support for such a challenge.
Many of the employment testing cases arise in factual situations where discrimination
was openly practiced in the past, see, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and evidence of such practices
might be used to support an inference of discrimination. Particularly where the validity
of the test is dubious, a history of discrimination might tilt the scales so that a court
would be forced to conclude that the only possible reason for establishing testing
procedures was discriminatory. A testing procedure with such an impermissible purpose
would have to fall under a rational basis test. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
Indeed, it should be emphasized that the rational basis test can be used to challenge
a testing procedure in any case where the test is so invalid that it has no relationship to
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This traditional approach to the review of allegedly discriminatory
testing procedures was also recently employed by the Fifth Circuit to
uphold the Georgia bar examination despite the absence of any validation study. In Tyler v. Vickery, 0 0 a class action was brought on behalf
of all blacks who had taken and failed the state bar examination. The
test was challenged as unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds. Although black applicants as a class had experienced
great difficulty in passing the bar examination,' 0' the court held the test
to be a rational means for the state to exclude persons who do not meet
its standards of competence. 0 2
The Futureof the TraditionalStandard
The traditional fourteenth amendment standard of review is being
questioned by the courts. The reasoning in Griggs has been extended
from cases brought under Title VII to those brought only on constitutional grounds; many decisions ostensibly made on fourteenth amendment grounds by lower courts have blurred the distinction between the
two standards."o '
what it seeks to predict, since such a test would fall under the more lenient arbitrary and
capricious test of economic equal protection.
100. 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3719 (U.S. June 14,
1976).
101. In July 1972, all of the black applicants failed the examination. In the two
succeeding examinations, more than one-half of the black applicants did not pass, as
compared with approximately one-third of the white applicants. Id. at 1092.
102. The court found that the bar examination had a rational relationship to an
examinee's capacity to enter the profession of law. Id. at 1103.
The courts have not been critical in their review of bar examinations. See,
e.g., Staley v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 2d 119, 121, 109 P.2d 667 (1941). In Feldman v. State
Bd. of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971), the Eighth Circuit applied a
rational basis test to uphold an Arkansas bar examination in the face of an applicant's
claim of a violation of constitutional rights:
[It cannot] be said that an essay type examination is inherently unfair or that
such a test has no rational connection with an applicant's fitness or capacity
to practice law. Id. at 705.
See also Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974).
103. See, e.g., Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974); Chance
v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). See generally Comment,
Equal Protection and Standardized Testing, 44 Miss. L.J. 900, 925-30 (1973).
This blending is particularly evident in cases involving the employment of teachers.
As originally enacted, Title VII contained a specific exemption for states and other
governmental employers. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Equal Employment
Opportunity, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b) (Supp. III 1973). The courts apparently compensated for this exemption by
subjecting school boards to the same level of scrutiny that would be required under the
statutory standard on the premise that private concerns should not be subject to more
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If it is assumed that the EEOC possesses expertise in the field of
validating employment tests, then it is arguable that the courts should
measure tests against the Guidelines, even in situations where they are
not technically applicable.'
In Washington v. Davis,1°5 however, the
Court declined to accept the argument found persuasive in the court of
appeals"' that the Guidelines should be used to give substance to the
fourteenth amendment in the employment area. The Fifth Circuit had
previously reached a similar conclusion in a fourteenth amendment
context in Tyler v. Vickery." 7
Other pre-Davis lower court decisions were premised on a belief
,that equal protection jurisprudence must take cognizance of developing
psychological knowledge. A three-judge district court in the Fourth
Circuit, for example, relied upon psychology experts in reaching its
decision in a fourteenth amendment suit brought by blacks charging
invidious discrimination due to a teacher certification examination. The
8 while recognizing the state's
court in United States v. North Carolina,""
interest in securing competent educators, refused to allow the state
legislature to set a minimum score for licensing teachers without a
validation study to prove that the cut-off point was related to teaching
qualifications. 0 u By not automatically sanctioning the test, the court
departed from the traditional standard.
The creation of the EEOC, with its mandate to formulate Guiderigorous standards than public employers. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1095-97 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3719 (U.S. June 14, 1976); see Wilson, supra

note 21, at 848-51; Comment, supra, at 910-22.
The intentional blending in this area is no longer necessary because the 1972
amendments to Title VII deleted the exemption for governmental units. See Grossman,
supra note 21, at 370-71.
104. See Comment, supra note 21, at 920.
105. 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976).

106. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
107.

517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3719 (U.S. June

14, 1976). The Fifth Circuit found Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), to be
persuasive authority. In Geduldig, it was claimed that a state-administered compensation plan which excluded from coverage disabilities associated with normal pregnancy
was sex discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth

amendment.

The Supreme Court upheld the state plan by applying the relaxed rational

relationship standard

of review and

ignored an

1604.10(b) (1975), which took a contrary position.
Tyler court to the racial discrimination issue.

EEOC Guideline,

29 C.F.R. §

This case was analogized by the

Note that this position does have the advantage of leaving open the issue of content

validation, rather than accepting the Guidelines as rigid standards.
108. 400 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975) (three-judge court).

109. Cut-off scores can be validated. The designers of the test given in North
Carolina approved higher minimum scores for use in Chicago and Los Angeles. Id. at
349 n.6.
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lines for equal employment, might be interpreted as a general expression
of congressional intent that contemporary psychological expertise should
be incorporated into equal protection analysis of employment practices.11 The obvious counterpoint is that Congress intentionally limited
Title VII's scope of application."' On balance, however, it seems
incongruous that Congress would incorporate modem scientific theory
into the vast majority of employment-related cases while leaving the
remainder to be decided on classical philosophical grounds.
The most effective approach might be to make use of the Second
Circuit's "sliding scale" analysis" 2 in fourteenth amendment employment cases. If a test has been designed in accordance with professionally accepted practices, then scrutiny should be limited to the traditional
fourteenth amendment reasonableness test. Where the test in question
has been prepared or selected arbitrarily, however, the courts should
impose a standard of review which approximates that used in Title VII
actions. In this way, the courts can give all litigants the benefit of
evolving principles of equal proteotion in the employment area without
undertaking unwarranted extension of a statute which is expressly limited in its applicability.
CONCLUSION

The original purpose of employment testing was to promote merit
hiring and -thereby eliminate biases not related to qualifications. Ironically, many of the professionally developed tests now being struck down
by the courts were intended to counteract the prejudices of those selecting among applicants."' If tests do serve a protective function, 114 then
the gains for qualified members of minority groups will be small if the
courts so discourage testing that reversion to subjective selection techniques becomes widespread." 5 The ultimate result of the current trend
under the EEOC Guidelines appears to be quota hiring 1 6 undertaken to
110. See note 42 supra.
111. See note 16 supra.
112. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
113. See Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1022 (1st Cir.
1974). It has been recognized that the stringent standards are making validation of tests
very difficult. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1122.
114. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 7, at 1664 n.124.
115. These subjective techniques are obviously more difficult to control for discrimination. See Comment, supra note 21, at 924.
116. See Wilson, supra note 21, at 873-74. This in itself is offensive to the theory
underlying Title VII. Note, supra note 97, at 466 n.15. Justice Blackmun, in his
concurring opinion in Moody, wrote that
too-rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines will leave the employer little
choice, save an impossibly expensive and complex validation study, but to en-
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avoid litigation over subjective techniques, 117 despite the express rejec-

tion of quotas in Title VII. 118
A middle ground is needed between -the relaxed fourteenth amend-

ment standard and the stringent EEOC Guidelines, especially for evaluating tests used to determine whether a person possesses a required

minimum level of knowledge or skill. In this highly technical field, the
agencies and the courts should make greater use of the expertise of

professional psychologists and accept content validation as appropriate
for tests measuring achievement.
gage in a subjective quota system of employment selection. This, of course,
is far from the intent of Title VII. 422 U.S. at 449.
117. Subjective techniques will also be required to meet EEOC standards:
Selection techniques other than tests, as defined in § 1607.2, may be improperly used so as to have the effect of discriminating against minority
groups. Such techniques include, but are not restricted to, unscored or casual
interviews and unscored application forms. Where there are data suggesting
employment discrimination, the person may be called upon to present evidence concerning the validity of his unscored procedures as well as of any
tests which may be used, the evidence of validity being of the same types
referred to in §§ 1607.4 and 1607.5. . . . 29 C.F.R. § 1607.13 (1975).
118. See note 5supra.

